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The question of polysemy and the representation of different lexical word-senses has 
recently attracted an increased interest in the linguistics and computational linguistics 
literature. In particular work in Generative Lexicon Theory (GLT, cf. Pustejovsky 
1995, 1998, Lascarides, Copestake & Briscoe 1996, Lascarides & Copestake 1998) 
has proposed to enrich the format of lexical representation so that a number of ‘novel’ 
word senses can be generated. In this paper, we discuss GLT and show that, while 
being able to derive novel word-senses, there are, however, problems with this 
approach. In particular, we argue that GLT lacks the expressivity necessary for 
supporting context sensitive reasoning, and show this by considering relevant 
examples involving underspecification inherent in verbs and the process of 
establishing semantic predicate-argument structures in utterance interpretation. The 
theoretical background of our work is the notion of utterance interpretation as 
explored in Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/95) and Dynamic Syntax 
(Kempson, Meyer-Viol, and Gabbay 1999), and in particular the idea of verbal 
underspecification developed in Marten (1999), where it is argued that verbs are 
lexically underspecified as to their semantic type, so that a verb’s eventual arity will 
only be established in the utterance context. From this perspective, the interplay 
between this structural underspecification, lexical polysemy and context sensitive 
interpretation leads to an alternative view on knowledge representation employed in 
utterance interpretation and parsing, namely that hearers employ world knowledge, 
rather than ‘lexical’ knowledge, in the task to derive the proposition expressed, and 
that enrichment of meaning involves a level of conceptual representational structure. 
In this paper, we are not discussing the theoretical aspects of this view in detail (cf. 
Hunter & Marten 1999, Marten 1999, and also Sperber & Wilson 1999?, Fodor & 
Lepore 1998?, Carston 1996) but rather we propose a formalization of enrichment of 
natural language expressions as used in parsing by means of default logic statements 
(Reiter 1980). We set out by discussing GLT in some detail, and then sketch our 
formalization of the basic architecture for relating parsed natural language structures 
and world knowledge. 
 
 
2. The Generative Lexicon 
Generative Lexicon Theory (GLT) is one recent formulation of lexical knowledge. It 
is part of a wider trend in (computational) linguistics to analyse lexical knowledge not 
as an ideally minimal set of knowledge specifying only basic syntactic and maybe 
thematic information, but rather to think of lexical items as more structured, for 
example as being related by semantic relations modelled as feature structures, or as 
specifying certain aspectual information (cf. e.g. Sag & Szabolcsi 1992, Pustejovsky 
& Boguraev 1996). In this section, we introduce GLT as formulated in Pustejovsky 
(1995) and discuss an extension of the theory proposed in Lascarides, Copestake & 
Briscoe (1996) and Lascarides & Copestake (1998). 
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2.1. Generative Lexicon Theory 
GLT as originally formulated by Pustejovsky (1995) proposes that information 
provided by lexical items is much richer than standardly assumed. In particular, GLT 
argues that the lexicon of a given natural language cannot simply be characterized as a 
list of items with only syntactic and minimal semantic information, for three reasons 
(1995: 39): 
 
 1. Words can be used creatively; they assume new senses in novel contexts. 
 2. Word senses are not atomic; they overlap and refer to other senses of the word. 
 3. A single word sense can have multiple syntactic realizations.  
 
The creative use of words is found, for example, with the adjective fast (1995: 44/45):  
 
(1a)   a fast boat 
(1b)   a fast typist 
(1c)   a fast book 
(1d)   a fast driver 
(1e)   a fast decision 
(1f)   a fast motorway 
 
The meaning of fast varies according to the noun it modifies, thus, Pustejovsky 
argues, giving rise to at least four different lexical entries (1995: 44/45): 
 
(2a)   fast1: to move quickly 
(2b)   fast2: to perform some act quickly 
(2c)   fast3: to do something that takes little time 
(2d)   fast4: to allow for driving a vehicle quickly on it  
       (ie. the motorway)  
 
There is seemingly no principled end to such a list, nor any way to relate one sense to 
another. Pustejovsky (1995: 45/46) presents the examples in (3) as being indicative of 
a similar problem; since a lexical entry for want would have to include at least the 
ones found in (4): 
 
(3a)   Mary wants another cigarette. 
(3b)   Mary wants a beer. 
(3c)   Mary wants a job. 
 
(4a)   want1: to want to smoke 
(4b)   want2: to want to drink 
(4c)   want3: to want to have  
 
Again, an increase in NP objects of want would lead to an increase in lexical entries 
(in addition to entries required due to varying syntactic complementation). 
  The problem of overlapping of different word senses can be seen with bake: 
 
(5a)   John baked the potatoes. 
(5b)   John baked a cake. 
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The verb bake, along with cook and fry, is, according to GLT, ambiguous between a 
'change-of-state' and a 'creation' reading; in (5a), the activity of baking changes the 
state of the object, potatoes, from cold to hot (and not_really_edible to edible), while 
in (5b), the object is the result of the activity – it did not previously exist. However, 
according to GLT, these two senses are not clearly distinguishable, even in context, 
since one sense is included in the other, and since the actual activity is not 
distinguished by the different objects. Thus, even if one were to allow many different 
senses, the postulation of two senses for bake here would obliviate their partial 
overlap. 
  Finally, Pustejovsky observes that a single form can participate in a number of 
syntactic realizations, corresponding to different senses (1995: 51): 
 
(6a)   Madison Avenue is apt to forget that most folks aren't members of   
    the leisure class.  (factive reading) 
 
(6b)   But like many others who have made the same choice, he forgot to  
    factor one thing into his plans: Caliphobia.   
    (non-factive reading) 
 
(6c)   As for California being a state being run by liberal environmental   
    loonies, let's not forget where Ronald Reagan came from.      
    (embedded question) 
 
(6d)   What about friends who forget the password or never got it?     
    (concealed question) 
 
(6e)   He leaves, forgets his umbrella, and comes back to get it.  
    (ellipsed non-factive) 
 
By simply postulating several entries for forget, both the relation between 
complement type and reading, as well as the common 'core meaning' of the verb are 
not expressed. 
  Thus, Pustejovsky concludes that the only way for a list-lexicon to deal with 
these phenomena is the postulation of an infinity of different senses for a single 
lexical item, which is not only unintuitive and cumbersome, but also fails to capture 
any structure or systematicity between several senses, both semantic and syntactic.  
  In contrast, GLT designs lexical entries which are structured, and thus can 
encode different senses, and which allow for the generation of novel word senses by 
composition of different features. That is, the different readings of bake (as in (5)) 
result from the complex lexical entry of the verb and from information encoded in the 
lexical entry of the object. It is this process of generativity, devising new senses by 
composition, by which GLT proposes to meet the demands of accounting for 
creativity, overlap of senses, and multiple syntactic realizations.  
  In order to achieve this, GLT introduces four levels of lexical semantic 
representation (1995: 61): 
 
  • argument structure 
  • event structure 
  • qualia structure 
  • lexical inheritance structure 
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Argument structure states in a standard way number and type of logical arguments, 
with the addition of 'shadow' and 'default'-arguments, different types of semantically 
necessary, but syntactically optional arguments. Event structure encodes aspectual 
lexical information, similar to, but more refined than, a simple event-variable. Qualia 
structure is probably the most novel (and controversial) idea in GLT, and it is also the 
structure with the most complicated internal structure. Qualia structure values encode 
information about what the lexical item is (refers to), what it consists of, what it is 
made of, and what it is used for. The relation among lexical items is encoded in the 
final structure, lexical inheritance, which expresses hyponymy and other lexical 
relations on a particular lattice structure. Information from individual lexical items is 
related to the lexical inheritance structure via the qualia and formal structure values of 
the lexical item. Similar to HPSG, values of predicates can be co-indexed to indicate 
feature unification. This particular selection of features is partly motivated by the 
claim that the information included in the entries is relevant for speakers' knowledge 
of language; it is claimed to play a role in grammar which distinguishes it from 
(other) world knowledge1.  
  The lexical entry for bake thus looks as in (7) (1995: 123): 
 
(7)     bake 
 
     EVENTSTR = E1 = e1:process 
          HEAD = e1 
 
           ARG1 =  1   animate_ind 
               FORMAL = physobj 
     ARGSTR = 
          ARG2 =  2   mass 
               FORMAL = physobj 
 
 
     QUALIA =  state_change_lcp 
          AGENTIVE = bake_act( e1,  1 ,  2  ) 
 
 
The entry illustrates possible values to the three structures of lexical information 
encoded in lexical entries (the fourth structure, lexical inheritance, serves as 
ontological backbone which helps interpret the values of the FORMAL parameter). The 
event structure value identifies 'baking' as a process, the headedness value is exploited 
for complex event structures and is here of minor importance. Argument structure 
makes the verb transitive and places further restrictions on the arguments2. The qualia 
structure values, finally, identify bake as belonging to the 'change of state' 'lexical-
                                                          
1
 Which seems to imply that, unless thinking is construed as being dependent on language, some 
information is being duplicated since for example the observation that one can eat cakes is part of the 
lexical meaning of cake, but surely we know that independent of the word cake, so that both the lexical 
item and the world knowledge include this statement.  
2
 There is actually some mismatch here between what is given in the typed feature structure and what, 
in our reading of the surrounding text, should have been in there; ARG2 should probably be a default or 
shadow argument to include sentences like 'John was baking in the kitchen'; furthermore, it is unclear 
why ARG2 is 'mass' here, since, as discussed below, the default reading of bake for Pustejovsky is the 
baking of things like potatoes, hence it should be 'count' (cf. also Fodor & Lepore (1998)).  
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conceptual paradigm' (lcp), over which generalizations over verb-classes can be 
stated. 'Agentive' means that the (saturated) predicate involves some 'bringing about'. 
In GLT, this is the only lexical entry for bake. The claim is now that objects such as 
potatoes or carrots leave the information from bake unmodified, but that objects like 
cake 'shift' the reading of bake to a resultative or 'create' reading. That is, apparently 
different senses of the verb really arise from interaction with the lexical specification 
of (object) NPs, in particular by co-composition of qualia values. The process is 
triggered from object NPs involving words like cake (1995: 123): 
 
(8)     cake 
 
     ARGSTR =  ARG1 = x:food_ind 
          D-ARG1 = y:mass 
           
          CONST = y 
          FORMAL = x 
     QUALIA =  TELIC = eat(e2, z, x) 
          AGENTIVE = bake_act(e1, w, y) 
 
The 'D-ARG' (i.e. default argument) indicates that cakes are made from stuff which can 
optionally be expressed as an oblique argument as for example in bake a cake 
from/with flour. This is taken up in the qualia structure, where CONST states that cakes 
consist of (are constituted by) the stuff encodable as a default argument, dough, 
maybe, or flour, or chocolate (but, not apparently, eggs, which are count). FORMAL 
encodes most directly what the word actually means, namely food (by feature sharing 
with ARG1), and this value can be found again at the lexical inheritance structure to 
give the embedding in the lexical net. TELIC means function, here that one eats cakes, 
while AGENTIVE indicates how the cake comes into existence, namely by baking. Note 
that the AGENTIVE value has the same predicate as bake, and that the distribution of 
the variables is such that the eating event involves an as yet unknown eater (z) and the 
food variable from ARG1 (x), but that baking involves not (x) in object position, but 
(y), the variable bound as 'mass' in D-ARG1 – that is, the act of baking does not 
involve the cake, but rather the stuff out of which it is made. Now the combination of 
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(9)     bake a cake 
 
           E1 = e1 : process  
     EVENTSTR =  E2 = e2 : state 
           RESTR = <α 
           HEAD = e1  
 
           ARG1 =   1   animate_ind  
                FORMAL = physobj  
 
                artifact 
     ARGSTR =   ARG2 =   2   CONST =  3   
                FORMAL = physobj  
 
           D-ARG1 =   3   material  
                 FORMAL = mass  
 
           create-lcp 
     QUALIA =   FORMAL = exist(e2,  2  ) 
           AGENTIVE = bake_act(e1,  1 ,  3  ) 
 
Amongst other details, the object results in a modified qualia structure which makes 
the VP (not the verb, incidentally) a member of the 'create' lcp. Furthermore it states 
that there are two events - one, the AGENTIVE value, involving the baker and the cake 
ingredients, and a second one, the FORMAL value, which is a stative event (cf. the 
event structure value for E2) at which the second argument, the cake, exists. Of 
interest are that several semantic intuitions are captured at the interrelated but distinct 
lexical levels; thus the resulting state of existence can be read off from the event and 
the qualia structures, while the interplay between argument and qualia structures 
allows for a mismatch between syntactic and semantic structure – a cake is the 
syntactic direct object, but is not a member of the extension of bake_act in the 
QUALIA. 
  GLT has highly structured lexical information for members of all parts of 
speech, and claims with those to provide a principled explanation for different (for 
GLT, lexical) meanings of words in context, accounting for a large range of readings, 
as well as for why certain readings are impossible, without the necessity for multiple 
lexical entries.  
 
 
2.2. The Problem of Context Sensitivity 
It is clear from the exposition of GLT so far that this approach assumes that there is a 
distinct and rich grammatical level of lexical information. A number of features and 
feature values are part of the encoded meaning of lexical items. However, under this 
conception one problem immediately arises. This is the demarcation of lexical and 
world knowledge, and the attendant problem of the demarcation of (the relevant) 
context (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1997). Since the GLT entries, though rich, are 
restricted to information which is 'grammatically relevant', only some contextual 
differences in word meaning are expressed. Thus for example, since the difference 
between the change of state and the create senses of bake is partly tied to the 
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mass/count distinction of the (D-argument of the) object, there is no difference 
between (10) and (11): 
 
(10)   John was baking a cake. 
(11)   John was baking a bread. 
 
While the concepts involved here are probably similar, there still is the possibility to 
construe them differently on occasion; for example, the baking of bread might involve 
more preparation and time, different ingredients, different tools, etc. than the baking 
of cakes3. Yet this difference is not expressed in GLT, which in fact predicts that the 
two senses of bake are completely identical.  
  On the other hand, since the creative reading results from the unification of 
qualia values, in particular only from those where the object's qualia value explicitly 
states that the object is created by baking, all other cases fall under the change of state 
reading, which is provided in the verb's entry. Thus, the meaning of (12) and (13) 
come out as the same: 
 
(12)   John was baking a potato. 
(13)   John was baking a flower. 
 
But, as in the examples above, there are contexts where the baking of potatoes might 
differ from the baking of flowers. Furthermore, the change of state reading should be 
available for objects which are made by baking: 
 
(14)   John was baking a pizza. 
 
In a context where the pizza is deep-frozen, bake has no creative meaning, but given 
the way qualia structures unify, this reading is not obtainable, unless an ambiguity 
between pizzas and deep-frozen pizzas is postulated, which is what GLT is trying to 
avoid.  
  All the examples discussed so far point to problems with GLT which the theory 
according to its own aims should be able to handle. More general problems of this 
approach, as for example discussed in Fodor & Lepore (1998), include that GLT 
specifies just an arbitrary subset of world knowledge we have about things in the 
world, rather than about words. In principle, according to this criticism, there is 
nothing to be gained from writing the fact that cakes are made by baking into the 
lexicon. Another problem concerns the use of typed feature structures for the 
representation of this kind of knowledge; feature unification as used in GLT does not 
support any logical reasoning, all lexical items have to be fully specified and be 
assigned a place in the feature hierarchy. Furthermore, context sensitivity has to be 
specified in advance as the presence or absence of particular features. In this sense, 
the system is too restricted for modelling context sensitive reasoning with world 
knowledge.  
  The lack of context sensitivity and inferencing in GLT has been addressed by 
Lascarides, Copestake & Briscoe (1996) and Lascarides & Copestake (1998). They 
provide a conditional logic which models commonsense entailment and which 
                                                          
3
 A nice way to make bread is to use sour dough baked on low heat in a wood fired stone oven. This 
doesn't work for cakes. 
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interacts with the senses provided by GLT4. Under this view, the novel senses of 
GLT, derived by feature unification, are default predicates which are part of the 
meaning of the sentence in which they occur. The second step of interpretation takes 
these typed feature structures as input and combines them into a model of discourse 
processing in which notions of discourse coherence (e.g. 'elaboration', 'contrast') are 
defined. The combination of GLT with discourse processing is exploited to provide an 
interpretation of default senses. A default sense can be checked against the world 
knowledge base. For the pizza example in (14) above, for example, the default 
information that John created the pizza results from the lexical information that pizzas 
are created by baking. The world knowledge base then might specify that baking deep 
frozen pizzas implies merely a state of change. This information is more specific 
(pertaining to more specific pizzas) than the information about pizzas in general. Now 
the conditional logic specifies that more specific information overrides more general 
information, and thus the default interpretation does not survive under embedding into 
the discourse, and bake is (again) interpreted in its change of state sense. In the 
absence of contradicting or more specific information, lexical defaults are taken over 
into the discourse. The model thus provides a means to combine the lexical senses 
from GLT with world knowledge and furthermore offers some indication of how the 
two interact.  
  There are, however, still problems with this enriched version of GLT. First, the 
model inherits the problems of GLT noted above, namely that the different senses are 
not fine-grained enough to distinguish different occasion specific concepts; different 
concepts with identical features (such as examples (10) - (13) above) are not 
distinguished at the discourse level, at least not if the defaults survive5. Secondly, this 
conception implies a rather unintuitive division of labour between lexical features and 
default reasoning; in the pizza example, the information that pizza baking (usually) 
means creating the pizza is lexical, while the information that baking a deep frozen 
pizza (usually) means changing the state of the pizza is part of the world knowledge, 
but the kind of information conveyed by the two statements is intuitively rather 
similar.  
  In conclusion, it appears that GLT, even when adjusted and amended, is not 
very suitable to model the process of concept formation relevant for the interpretation 
of underspecified predicate-argument structures. The approach suffers, from the 
perspective adopted here, from a suboptimal division of the notions of lexical and 
world knowledge which results in counter-intuitive analyses6. In the next section, we 
discuss how these problems can be overcome.  
 
 
3. Default reasoning with world knowledge 
In this section we introduce an alternative approach to the knowledge hearers employ 
in parsing, namely a default logic characterization of world knowledge, and show how 
the logic can be employed in the establishment of predicate argument structures. We 
assume here that reasoning applies to the output of the parser, that is, an account is 
                                                          
4
 This work is discussed more extensively in Hunter & Marten (1999) and Wilson (1999). 
5
 If the default interpretations are overridden, more information might be included, depending on the 
world knowledge base. In order to model enrichment in the sense assumed in this paper, defaults would 
always be overridden and thus be pointless.  
6
 There are also a number of potential problems associated with the use of conditional logic with 
defaults for this kind of reasoning, which might be better formalized by employing default logic; cf. 
Hunter & Marten (1999: 30/31) for further discussion.  
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given of how world knowledge interacts with predicates of varying arity, but not of 
how these predicates are formed. However, the dynamics of this process could 
possibly be added into the picture at a later stage. Furthermore, there is no 
prioritization of assumptions, that is, the notion of relevance remains unanalysed in 
the version discussed here. The work thus is mainly concerned with modelling 
reasoning with world knowledge and predicate argument structures under the 
assumption that lexical items address concepts as discussed in the following 
subsection. Consequently, all reasoning with linguistic structures is located in the 
world knowledge, which means in particular that it is open to logical inferencing and 
does not run over typed-feature structures. As a further contrast to GLT, we represent 
world knowledge as statements in default logic (as opposed to conditional logic) 
which incorporates classical first-order logic and provides an expressive and clear 
format for stating context sensitive reasoning7. We first introduce the system and 
compare it with the analysis given in section 2. 
 
 
3.1. A default logic approach 
In our system, the output of the parser is represented as function symbols which are 
translated into the logical language with recourse to world knowledge so that 
information from the parser and contextual default reasoning interact. Semantic 
information is represented as 'concepts', where a concept is a term of the logical 
language and accesses a set of logical statements (i.e. 'assumptions'), although the 
actual set accessed is at present left unspecified. Both these representations are part of 
the logical language (the world knowledge) expressed by default rules, so that the 
term accessing the set of assumptions may be part of assumptions in the set8.  
Reasoning with the output of the parser and world knowledge is characterized as 
comprising three related activities; commonsense checking, commonsense 
inferencing, and commonsense explaining.  
  Commonsense checking establishes whether a given output from the parser is 
consistent with world knowledge facts. The notions of normal and unusual 
information can be checked with reference to a (arbitrary) subset of default rules 
which might be called Normality default rules. For example, the idea that buttering 
toasts is usually done with a knife can be expressed with the following default rule: 
 
(15)   Butter(X, the_toast) : Butter(X, the toast, with(a_knife)) 
       Butter(X, the_toast, with(a_knife) 
 
The rule in (15) is a default rule. It states that, given Butter(X, the_toast) (i.e. the 
expression to the left of the colon, the 'precondition'), and furthermore given that 
Butter(X, the_toast, with(a_knife)) (i.e. the expression to the right of the colon, the 
'jusitfication') is consistent with world knowledge, then Butter(X, the_toast, 
with(a_knife)) (that is now the expression under the line, the 'consequent') can be 
inferred9. The rule is stated over expressions of the logical language, not over the 
output of the parser directly. It is thus a piece of world knowledge, expressing an 
aspect of what (most) people know about buttering toasts. With reference to this rule, 
                                                          
7
 Cf. Reiter (1980) for a description of default logic. 
8
 Cf. also Rips (1995) for a similar conception of psychological concepts. 
9
 Technically, the inference is valid if no inconsistencies result with respect to the inferences derived, 
not with the total set of assumptions. It is presently left open which assumptions constitute relevant 
world knowledge.  
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the sentence in (16) can be checked, which we assume is represented as (17) after 
parsing: 
 
(16)   John buttered the toast with a knife. 
(17)   butter(John, the_toast, with(a_knife)) 
 
The first step in the interpretation of (17) is to translate the 'lexical' function symbol 
butter (lower case) in (17) into the world knowledge predicate Butter (upper case), 
which is formally achieved by the world knowledge predicate Holds applying to the 
output of the parse: 
 
(18)   Holds(butter(X, Y, Z)) : Butter(X, Y, Z) 
       Butter(X, Y, Z) 
 
The Translation default rule in (18) effectively states that the lexical predicate butter 
can be interpreted as the conceptual predicate Butter if it is consistent with the world 
knowledge to do so. Furthermore, commonsense inferences can be stated over the 
output from parsing using Holds. For example: 
 
(19)   Holds(butter(X, Y, Z)) & PartOf(X, X') & PartOf(Y, Y') &     
       Human(X') & Food(Y') : Holds(butter(X, Y)   
         Holds(butter(X, Y))  
 
The Facilitation rule in (19) allows the inference from the three place function symbol 
butter to the two place function symbol butter under the assumption that subject and 
object are human and food respectively, and that the inference is consistent with 
world knowledge. Holds then translates the inferred expression into a world predicate: 
 
(20)   Holds(butter(X, Y)) : Butter(X, Y) 
       Butter(X, Y) 
 
Now the inferred expression in (20) can be used as a precondition of the Normality 
rule in (15). The information in (17) is thus not only consistent with the world 
knowledge, but can also be seen as redundant in the sense that the same information 
can be inferred by Normality rules.  
  Before proceeding, we briefly point out what this system of reasoning does. 
This model assumes that all semantic information is located in the world knowledge, 
which is represented as a (large) set of first-order logic statements and default rules. 
The output of the parser is taken to be uninterpreted. Interpretation is provided by 
taking this output, that is here predicate–argument structures of varying arity, and 
relating it to the predicate symbols which are in the world knowledge. Given the 
complete generality of the system, both enrichment (as in (15)) and inferences (as in 
(19)) can be stated. Although the system requires a large number of individual 
statements and rules, it has the advantage that steps of interpretation are explicitly and 
clearly statable. The following discussion includes further examples of how world 
knowledge interacts with natural language representations. 
  The example considered above involved information consistent with world 
knowledge. The following example, in contrast, is unusual: 
 
(21)   butter(John, the_toast, with(a_spade)) 
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By using Translation rule (18), the lexical predicate is translated into a world 
predicate: 
 
(22)   Butter(John, the_toast, with(a_spade)) 
 
Furthermore, by the rules in (19) and (20), the proposition in (23) can be inferred 
from (21): 
 
(23)   Butter(John, the_toast) 
 
The assumption in (23) can in turn be used with the Normality default rule in (15) to 
give (24): 
 
(24)   Butter(John, the_toast, with(a_knife)) 
 
Under the assumption that the world knowledge includes the information that (22) and 
(24) are contradictory, the information in (21) can be flagged as unusual with respect 
to world knowledge. Note that the system merely indicates why (21) is unusual, but 
does not imply any resolution, which has to be stated separately. This contrasts with 
the GLT position where principles regulate the interpretation of defaults, e.g. in this 
example, the default inference (if it was arrived at) would be suppressed given that 
with a spade is part of the sentence. The aim here is more modest, since inconsistency 
is checked, but not resolved.  
  Commonsense explaining involves deriving new predicates, either world 
knowledge predicates or Holds inferences, so that commonsense inferencing as in 
(19) above can be seen as an instance of commonsense explaining. Another instance 
of commonsense explaining involves term substitution. By using term substitution, 
function symbols can be replaced by other, possibly more complex, function symbols, 
which might be more meaningful in a given context. That is to say, substitution 
licenses the translation of one predicate into another, or possibly several other 
predicates if doing so is consistent with world knowledge. For example, for the n-ary 
function symbol flies(α1, …, αn), where α1, …, αn are  terms, the following 
substitutions might be useful:  
 
(25a)   Sub(flies(α1, …, αn), moves(through_the_air(α1, …, αn))) 
(25b)   Sub(flies(α1, …, αn), moves(through_a_trajectory(α1, …, αn))) 
(25c)   Sub(flies(α1, …, αn), moves(quickly(α1, …, αn))) 
(25d)   Sub(flies(α1, …, αn), moves(swiftly(α1, …, αn))) 
 
Which one of possible substitution rules is appropriate is of course context dependent. 
Consider the examples in (26) and (27): 
 
(26)   flies(this_helicopter, to(the_island)) 
(27)   flies(time, like(an_arrow)) 
 
These two examples can be rewritten using substitution with the following default 
rules (where T stands for zero or more further term variables): 
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(28)   PhysicalObject(X) : Sub(flies(X, T), moves(through_the_air(X, T))) 
      Sub(flies(X, T), moves(through_the_air(X, T))) 
 
(29)   ¬Aircraft(X) : Sub(flies(X, T), moves(quickly(X, T))) 
      Sub(flies(X, T), moves(quickly(X, T))) 
 
Application of these rules (and assuming the relevant world knowledge facts, e.g. 
PhysicalObject(this_helicopter)) results in the commonsense explanation of (26) and 
(27) as (30) and (31): 
 
(30)   moves(through_the_air(this_helicopter, to(the_island))) 
(31)   moves(quickly(time, like(an_arrow))) 
 
As these examples show, term substitution thus provides another means of using 
default inferences in reasoning with parsed natural language strings and world 
knowledge. It should be noted that there is considerable overlap between substitution 
and Holds inferences; the information provided by (30) and (31), for example, could 
equally have been arrived at by a default rule using the Holds predicate. This adds to 
the expressivity of the system, which can be constrained according to application. 
  Whilst the system outlined in here does not provide a formal analysis of concept 
formation, there are a number of traits which make it an attractive starting point for 
the development of such an analysis. As the examples discussed above show, the 
system handles forms of enrichment. For example, the enrichment of a constituent, 
that is the inference from (32) to (33) is expressible: 
 
(32)   John buttered the toast. 
(33)   John buttered the toast with a knife. 
 
Similarly, the inference from (34) to (35): 
 
(34)   John buttered the toast with a fork. 
(35)   John buttered the toast. 
 
Furthermore, by substitution, (36) can be translated to (37): 
 
(36)   John buttered the toast. 
(37)   John applied an even layer of butter to the toast. 
 
These three inferences are stated within one system of knowledge representation, 
which is capable of formalizing context sensitive and uncertain reasoning. By using 
explicit facilitation and translation rules, inferences can be incrementally added or 
retracted according to context. Furthermore, prototypical information can be 
represented by individually specified normality defaults. The expressive power thus 
exceeds typed feature structures and lattice theoretic representations, and provides a 
better means to represent processes of general reasoning. 
  To summarize, the system advocated here aims at providing a clear logic based 
formal account of how general reasoning interacts with output from parsing, in 
particular with predicate–argument structures of varying arity. The system is 
formulated in Default Logic, so that steps of inference are represented as default rules 
which license the commonsense checking, inferencing, and explaining of logical input 
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structures, while being able to express context sensitivity and uncertainty. The 
underlying assumption is that natural language expressions address concepts, that is 
expressions of the logic, and that all interpretation is inferential, expressible in the 
system. The approach thus overcomes the problem of postulating two distinct levels 
of interpretation, such as seen with feature structures and conditional logic in GLT. 
The system is furthermore very expressive, since it offers several ways to derive 





In this paper we have discussed aspects of the formal representation of lexical and 
world knowledge. We have discussed Generative Lexicon Theory and extensions 
thereof, and have argued thats that approach is not fully satisfactory for the 
representation of context sensitive reasoning in utterance interpretation. We then have 
proposed an alternative formalization which does not assume rich lexical 
representations, but rather provides a direct interface between underspecified parsed 
strings and conceptual or world knowledge. We have shown how this interface can be 
modelled with recourse to default logic, and how a number of common processes at 
the interface, such as inferencing, enrichment, and inconsistency checking, can be 
modelled. Inevitably, the system is presented only in outline10. Yet we hope to have 
shown that our formalization provides a genuine alternative to typed-feature structure 
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